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In this paper it will be addressed the possibility of an account of novel predictions of 
unexpected  phenomena  by  physical  theories  within  van  Fraassen's  anti-realism.  In 
particular it will be considered two important cases in modern physics, the prediction of 
the bending of light in Einstein's theory of gravity, and the prediction of antimatter in 
quantum electrodynamics. It will be defended that van Fraassen's anti-realism does not 
seem to enable an account of novel predictions. 
1 Introduction
There is a well-known claim that Bas C. van Fraassen’s anti-realism does not give an 
account of novel predictions of unexpected phenomena. In this work I will give a fresh 
look  at  this  claim  by  considering  novel  predictions  from  a  perspective  related  to 
intertheoretical relations.
In part 2, I will set the stage for the discussion by addressing Alan Musgrave and van 
Fraassen's views on the subject. In this section I will develop a characterization of novel 
predictions by taking into account intertheoretical relations.  In part 3, I will present two 
'case-studies': the prediction of the bending of light in Einstein's theory of gravity, and 
the prediction of anti-electrons in quantum electrodynamics. For these particular cases, I 
will defend the view that we can separate novel predictions in two groups: general and 
specific novel predictions, which enable to address novel predictions without the need 
for a detailed account of the relevant intertheoretical relations for each case. In part 4, 
by taking into account the previous sections, I will defend the view that van Fraassen 
faces problems to give an account of novel predictions of unexpected phenomena. In 
particular van Fraassen’s anti-realism cannot give an account of novel predictions even 
in a limited relative way, by relating a general novel prediction made within different 
theoretical frameworks to a derivation made using a particular theory.
2 On Musgrave and van Fraassen's views
Regarding the predictive success of physical  theories,  Musgrave stresses the need to 
distinguish between a theory's  capacity to accommodate known phenomena from the 
prediction  of  unknown  phenomena  (Musgrave  1985,  210-11).  Thus,  Babylonian 
astronomy was  capable  of  predicting  lunar  eclipses  with a  high  accuracy,  as  it  did 
Ptolemaic astronomy (Musgrave 1988, 231). Nowadays  we do not consider these as 
examples of scientific theories, they are seen more as mathematical models that were 
able to accommodate observed regularities.
A completely different situation occurs, according to Musgrave, when a new theory 
predicts  new  (yet  not  observed  an  unexpected)  phenomena.  Musgrave  thinks  that 
realism  can  give  a  good  account  of  this,  and  thinks  that  anti-realist  accounts,  in 
particular van Fraassen's, cannot. In Musgrave’s view, when van Fraassen addresses this 
subject  in  The Scientific Image,  he only provides a Darwinian metaphor for  making 
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sense of  maintaining empirically adequate  theories:  only successful  theories  survive 
(van Fraassen 1980, 39-40; Musgrave 1985, 210).1 Musgrave criticizes this argument, 
since in his view 'to say that only successful theories are allowed to survive is not to 
explain  why  any  particular  theory  is  successful'  (Musgrave  1985,  210).  That  is, 
according to  Musgrave, van Fraassen does not give an account of the prediction of 
unexpected phenomena by a new theory.
In 2006 van Fraassen provided a further remark that is related to the so-called no-
miracles argument, while not addressing explicitly the ‘problem’ of novel predictions:2 
'the success of science is not a miracle, because in any theoretical change both the past 
empirical success retained and new empirical successes were needed as credentials for 
acceptance' (van Fraassen 2006, 298-9). Van Fraassen made this remark in the context 
of rebuffing structural realism’s claim regarding a possible structural continuity between 
an old theory and a new superseding theory.3 To van Fraassen there is no need for a 
putative structural continuity to cover the continuity in empirical adequacy, it is only 
necessary  that  the  new  theory  implies  approximately  ‘the  same  predictions  for  the 
circumstances  in  which  the  older  theories  were  confirmed  and  found  adequately 
applicable’ (van Fraassen 2006, 298), i.e., the new theory must duplicate the empirical 
success of the past theory (or equivalently it must retain/accumulate the past empirical 
knowledge  or  empirical  structure;  see  van  Fraassen  2006,  298-301).  I  doubt  that 
Musgrave  would  accept  this  ‘newer’  remark  as  providing  an  account  of  how  new 
theories are able to predict unexpected phenomena. Van Fraassen's comments give no 
indication to  a  possible answer.  In  fact  they can be seen as simply referring  to  the 
methodology adopted, according to some, in scientific research, i.e. the matching and 
superseding of the empirical adequacy of an older theory by a new theory is a sine qua 
non condition for the acceptance of the new theory.
In Musgrave's  view there are still  some loss-ends in framing beyond an intuitive 
level a relevant notion of novel prediction: 'Difficulties remain, of course, not least that 
of making precise the intuitive distinction between known effects and novel predictions' 
(Musgrave 1985, 211). Van Fraassen develops a related point by picking up William 
Whewell's  notion of  independence:  the prediction of unexpected phenomena can be 
taken to be independent support for a new theory. In van Fraassen's view the notion of 
independence must be related to the existing theories and experimental knowledge at the 
time the new theory was being developed; accordingly, 'the old charge of arbitrariness 
lurks nearby, of course, for this is to some extent a matter of historical accident' (van 
1 Let us recall that in van Fraassen’s view only empirical adequacy (i.e. saving the phenomena) counts as 
criteria for acceptance of a theory (see, e.g., van Fraassen 1980, 12). 
2 Musgrave and van Fraassen's arguments are made in the context of the so-called no-miracles argument. 
This is taken to be a positive general argument that says that only realism 'doesn't make the success of 
science a miracle' (Putnam 1975, 73). Arguments against and in favor of this argument have been made. 
According, for example, to Howson (2000, 52-4), Lipton (2005, 1267), and Magnus and Callender (2004, 
323-29) the argument rests on a fallacy. However this view is made regarding only a probabilistic version 
of the argument. Another way of presenting the argument is as an inference to the best explanation. Here 
too we face a possible problem, now of circularity (Magnus and Callender 2004, 330-31; Newman 2010, 
112). Again maybe this only shows that the argument should not be presented as an inference to the best 
explanation. A more sympathetic view regarding the no-miracles argument was given in Schurz (2009) 
defending a restricted form of the argument based on a proposed structural correspondence between a 
superseded theory and a new theory. I will not address here directly the no-miracles argument, only the 
question about van Fraassen's anti-realist eventual account of novel predictions.
3 It  seems that  van  Fraassen sees the relation between  the  'new'  and  'old'  theory in a  way that  has  
similarities  with  some  realist's  views  in  terms  of  theory  reduction:  the  'new'  theory  is  completely 
superseding  the  'old'  theory  (even  if  just  in  terms  of  empirical  structure).  For  a  different  view  on 
intertheoretical relations see Darrigol (2008).
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Fraassen 1985, 267). This might create a doubt about to what point (or in what sense) 
are the prediction of unknown phenomena novel in a philosophically relevant way, or 
simply dependent of an historical cultural context that sees them that way and possibly, 
because of this, philosophically the prediction of unexpected phenomena might not be 
so important after all?
In my view the situation is not one of relativism or historical contingency as these 
previous views might led us to think; in terms of intertheoretical relations it is possible 
to  determine  with  clarity  what  are  novel  predictions,  which  we  can  regard  as 
constituting  independent  support  for  a  new  theory.  Musgrave  himself  called  the 
attention, in a later work, to the possibility of making a clear distinction between known 
predictions and novel predictions: 'a predicted fact is a novel fact for a theory if it was 
not used to construct that theory' (Musgrave 1988, 232). I do not think that this is the 
best  option  for  framing  a  meaningful  notion  of  novel  prediction.  In  fact,  is  it  not 
possible  that  there  are predicted  facts  (of  a  new and  old theories),  not  used in  the 
construction of the new theory, that are not novel predictions? We would need to make 
an exhaustive list of all 'predicted facts' to disentangle this matter.
I think that a characterization of novel predictions based on comparing  'new' and 
'old'  theories  (i.e.  on  intertheoretical  relations)  is  less  ambiguous,  even  if  this 
characterization is  to be applied case by case,  after clarifying what are the relevant 
theories or theoretical approaches for each case.  This view agrees with van Fraassen's 
comment that we must take into account existing theories,  but  there is no historical  
contingency here. It is not important if a particular novel prediction is an historical  
accident; what matters is that in physics there are novel predictions, and this is not an  
historical contingency.
 In this way, I take the prediction of the bending of light in Einstein's gravitation 
theory to be a novel prediction (not known and not expected according to Newton's 
gravitation theory; the 'old' theory in this case); another example is the novel prediction 
of anti-electrons made in quantum electrodynamics (unexpected according to relativity 
theory and classical electrodynamics; the 'old' theories in this case). Now, van Fraassen 
seems to be facing a problem. Are not these novel predictions taken to be independent 
support for the corresponding physical theory? I think they are. They are not part of the 
phenomena saved by the older theory, neither they are part of the phenomena not saved 
by the old theory and expected to be saved by the new theory, i.e. they are an (eventual) 
independent  support  for  the  new  theory.   The  theory  is  predicting  unexpected 
regularities  in  nature.  It  will  be  empirically  adequate  only  if  observation  and/or 
experimentation agree with the theory's novel predictions. 
3 The distinction between general and specific novel predictions
3.1 Two case-studies:  the bending of light and antimatter
Two well-known novel predictions in 20th century physics are the bending of light due 
to gravity and the ‘existence’ of antimatter.
According to Newtonian gravitation there is no bending of light due to gravity and 
there is no reason to expect such phenomenon. It  is a novel prediction of Einstein’s 
theory of gravity which as been confirmed in 1919 (see, e.g., d'Inverno 1992, 199-201). 
Looking closely into the derivation of this prediction within Einstein’s theory of gravity 
we see that it is already derived using the so-called parametrized post-Newtonian (PPN) 
formalism,  which  contains  the  post-Newtonian  approximation  of  different  metric 
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theories of gravity as a special case:4 by choosing a particular set of parameters the PPN 
formalism gives the post-Newtonian limit  for different  theories of gravity (see,  e.g., 
Misner, Thorne, and Wheeler 1973, 1069). In fact the bending of light is a very general 
prediction that can even be derived without a new theory of gravity, by considering a 
relativistic kinematical principle (the equivalence principle) that relates phenomena in a 
constant  gravitational  field  observed  from a  inertial  reference  frame  to  phenomena 
observed in a constantly accelerated reference frame. With this approach it is already 
possible to predict the bending of light (even if this approach only predicts half of the 
deflection predicted by Einstein’s theory of gravity; see, e.g., Callahan 2000, 191-195). 
The situation is then the following:
1) The bending of  light  can be predicted  in the post-Newtonian  approximation, not 
being necessary to take fully into account Einstein’s field equations.
2) It can be derived by other rival theories (using an equivalent PPN approximation).
3) It can be derived by a general principle (the equivalence principle) defined within the 
1905 theory of relativity.
We see that  there is  an ‘atmosphere of generality’  in all this; apparently it  is  not  a 
prediction that comes out only of Einstein’s field equations. I see the possibility for two 
excluding options here:5
1) Maintain the view that the bending of light is a novel prediction of Einstein’s theory 
of gravity.
2) Do not  regard the bending of  light  as a  novel  prediction of Einstein’s  theory of 
gravity,  but  as  a  prediction  already  made  within  the  different relativity  theory 
framework. 
A realist would possibly choose option 1, since it would open the door to the possibility 
of showing that only Einstein’s theory of gravity gives a consistent derivation of the 
bending of light, and that the equivalence principle derivation could in fact be seen as an 
approximation, or better a work in progress, that only makes sense from the perspective 
of the later developed theory. With this option the realist would possibly only have to 
confront the eventuality of the underdetermination of Einstein’s theory of gravity (see, 
e.g.,  Lyre  and  Eynck  2003),  which  he  might  intent  to  undermine  by  defending  a 
structural  realism that might not be affect  by the possible underdetermination of the 
theory.6 The realist would certainly reject option 2 because it would open the door for a 
strong form of underdetermination in which  different theoretical frameworks give the 
same novel predictions. 
An anti-realist  would reject  option 1 or  at  least  consider  that  even for  structural 
4 We can apply the post-Newtonian approximation to the case of a weak gravitational field and slow 
motions;  this  enables  the  description  of  gravitational  phenomena  in  terms  of  second-order  (post-
Newtonian) corrections to the (first-order) Newtonian treatment. 
5 I will not consider the case of alternative theories of gravity since, in the present time, there are no 
convincing rivals to Einstein’s theory of gravity (see, e.g., Will 2006).
6 The  possible  underdetermination  of  physical  theories  is  usually  considered  an important  argument 
against realism (see, e.g., Ladyman 1998); there are authors that consider that structural realism avoids 
any possible underdetermination problem (see, e.g., French and Ladyman 2003; Cao 2003; Worrall 2009; 
Bain 2009).
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realism there still would be a serious case of underdetermination (see, e.g., Lyre 2009). 
The best option for the anti-realist seems to be 2 since, as mentioned, it opens the door 
for a strong underdetermination of novel predictions between non-reducible theoretical 
frameworks. This could be presented as a negative argument against the realist claim 
that considers novel predictions as evidence for realism, but by itself is not a positive 
argument showing how, for example,  van Fraassen's  anti-realism can make sense of 
novel predictions. 
Both the realist and the anti-realist would have to provide a conclusive argument to 
show the theoretical  continuity or discontinuity between the theory of relativity and 
Einstein’s theory of gravity (i.e. they must address questions regarding intertheoretical 
relations).  There is  an alternative to having to choose between options 1 and 2 that 
enables a correct characterization of the situation by stressing the de facto situation that 
there is a different degree of application of theories in novel predictions of unknown 
phenomena.
Instead of thinking in terms of novel predictions of one or the other theory one can 
think in terms of general novel predictions and specific novel predictions.  In this way 
the bending of light can be seen as a general prediction that is made by Einstein’s theory 
of  gravity and  that  can  also  be made by the  theory of  relativity and  a  kinematical 
principle;  and,  for  example,  the prediction of  black holes  can be seen as  a  specific 
prediction  of  Einstein’s  theory of  gravity  since  it  arises  only by consider  an  exact 
solution of  Einstein's  field  equations  (see,  e.g.,  Ludvigsen  1999,  134-155).  It  is  the 
general novel predictions that bring the possibility of a strong underdetermination of 
novel predictions. 
To show that this way of addressing novel predictions in terms of general or specific 
predictions can be applied more generally let us consider another example where the 
differentiation makes sense. 
As it is well-known, Paul Dirac, using his relativistic wave equation, predicted the 
‘existence’ of antimatter, which was an unexpected phenomena according to classical 
theories and was confirmed in the early thirties (see, e.g., Schweber 1994, 66-9). Like in 
the case of the bending of light, we are facing here an ‘atmosphere of generality’ since 
this is not a specific prediction of quantum electrodynamics. In reality already the so-
called  Klein-Gordon  equation  predicted  antimatter.7 Dirac  himself  noticed  that  the 
prediction  of  antimatter  followed  from  any  relativistic  wave  equation  (for  charged 
particles), due to the fact that the relativistic energy-momentum equation has a quadratic 
form (Dirac 1930, 360).  In this way,  antimatter is not a novel prediction specific to 
quantum electrodynamics. 
From a realist perspective this situation might seem to be unproblematic. According 
to Steven Weinberg, local quantum field theory (LQFT), with its prediction of negative 
and positive charged quanta – and quantum electrodynamics can be seen as a particular 
instantiation  of  LQFT  –,  is  the  only  theoretical  approach  that  satisfies  three 
assumptions:  the  principle  of  Lorentz  invariance  (i.e.  the  theory  of  relativity),  the 
quantum formalism, and the so-called cluster decomposition principle (Weinberg 1999). 
Jonathan  Bain  uses  this  result,  even  if  it  is  not  a  strict  theorem,  to  defend  the 
impossibility of underdetermination of LQFT (Bain, 1999).  
7 This equation was first developed by E. Schrödinger when looking for a wave equation to describe 
quantum  phenomena.  Using  this  wave  equation  Schrödinger  determined  the  energy  levels  for  the 
hydrogen  atom,  and  arrived  at  a  result  that  was  not  in  agreement  with  Sommerfeld‘s  result  for  the 
hydrogen spectrum (obtained within the so-called old quantum theory), and so he drooped it (Kragh 1981, 
32-7). It was only in 1935 that the equation reappeared when it was shown that it could give a physical  
description of Mesons (Kragh 1984, 1031).
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From an anti-realist  perspective one might  try to overturn  the realist  position by 
stressing the fact  that more than a result  that follows imperatively from a (quantum 
field) theory, it is a prediction that is made previous to quantum field theory proper (as 
the prediction of the bending of light  can be made previous to Einstein’s theory of 
gravity) by a quantization of any (relativistic) charged   classical field, like for example 
the complex scalar field (see, e.g., Bogoliubov and Shirkov 1959, 35-8). 
Again,  like  in  the  previous  case,  each  option  would  need  a  clear  account  of 
intertheoretical  relations,  in  this  case  between  the  theory  of  relativity,  classical 
electrodynamics, quantum theory, and quantum electrodynamics. A simpler option is to 
frame the discussion in terms of general or specific novel predictions (which does not 
involve engaging into details of intertheoretical relations). Antimatter can be seen as a 
general prediction made for any (charged) quantum field, while, for example, the light-
light scattering can be seen as a specific prediction of quantum electrodynamics that is 
not expected according to classical electrodynamics (Schweber 1962, 558-9).8 
Summing up the results so far: the two novel predictions (the bending of light and 
antimatter) are both general predictions not specific to Einstein’s theory of gravity and 
quantum electrodynamics. They can arise in one case from the theory of relativity and a 
kinematical principle (previous to any new theory of gravity), and in the other case from 
the quantization of any relativistic wave equation for charged matter. By considering 
general novel predictions we have a new perspective from which to discuss realist and 
anti-realist positions regarding novel predictions. One example is the possibility of a 
strong underdetermination of general predictions. However this is a negative argument 
against realism not a positive argument that makes sense of novel predictions from an 
anti-realist position. We will see in section 4 that  framing the discussion in terms of  
general novel predictions will help in revealing the weakness of van Fraassen’s position.
3.2 Kirchhoff's prediction of light diffraction as a general prediction 
Saatsi and Vickers (2011) presented a case-study that in their view might undermine 
certain realist positions; it is based on Kirchhoff's derivation of a diffraction equation, 
within an ether paradigm of propagation of (scalar) light waves, for the case of light 
incident on a screen with a small aperture. This equation predicts  – in similar lines to 
Fresnel's novel prediction (when compared with Newton's corpuscular theory of light) 
of a bright spot in the centre of the shadow of a small circular disk  – a diffraction 
pattern in the intensity of light on the other side of the screen. Saatsi and Vickers call 
the  attention  to  the  fact  that  Kirchhoff's  derivation  relied  on  physically  wrong 
assumptions  (from  the  point  of  view  of  Maxwell's  theory),  which  are  even 
mathematically inconsistent:
it  turns  out  that  Kirchhoff's  derivation turns  on crucial  assumptions  regarding the  amplitude of light 
waves  that (i)  differ considerably from the actual situation (as described by Maxwell's equations, for 
example) in various respects, and (ii) as a matter of fact are inconsistent (Saatsi and Vickers 2011, 30);
the 'success-fuelling' assumptions are radical wrong (Saatsi and Vickers 2011, 31).
8 In this paper I  will  not be making a case for a throughout characterization of novel  predictions in 
physics in terms of general or specific novel predictions. I am only considering that it is meaningful for 
the two important cases being considered here (i.e. we can give clear-cut examples of general or specific 
novel predictions), and that this characterization is useful when approaching the issue of novel predictions 
by considering intertheoretical relations.
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From this, in my view wrong, assessment of the situation Saatsi and Vickers go on to 
conclude that realists have a problem since the predictive success of the theory seems to 
depend on wrong assumptions (Saatsi and Vickers 2011, 42).9
As Saatsi and Vickers called the attention to, Kirchhoff's equation can be derived 
from a set of consistent assumptions within the theoretical framework where Kirchhoff 
develops his approach, that of a scalar wave theory based on the idea of an ether taken 
to be the bearer of light waves (Saatsi and Vickers 2011, 39). They go on to consider 
these two approaches, Kirchhoff's original one and the newer consistent approach, as 
different theories (Saatsi and Vickers 2011, 39), while they call the attention that these 
are not fundamental theories (Saatsi and Vickers 2011, 36). I would instead prefer to call 
them different models developed within the same theoretical framework.10 By calling 
the  models  theories,  Saatsi  and  Vickers  can  claim  that  we  are  facing  a  case  of 
underdetermination.11 Even  conceding  to  Saatsi  and  Vickers  that  the  two  identical 
equations developed in the ether paradigm can be considered as two diffraction theories, 
it is still the case that, contrary to Saatsi and Vickers’ claim, Kirchhoff's equation does 
not depend crucially on his wrong assumptions:
all  of  the  possible  ways  in  which  Kirchhoff's  assumption  (A1)  differs  from the  truth  (according  to 
Maxwell's equations), it just so happens that the difference has negligible effect (Saatsi and Vickers 2011, 
41).
That is, mathematically Kirchhoff's wrong assumptions do no affect the final form of 
the  equation.  Accordingly,  Saatsi  and  Vickers  consider  that  'due  to  the  nature  of 
diffraction there is a many-to-one mapping, so to speak, from amplitude-distribution-at-
the-aperture to diffraction patterns' (Saatsi and Vickers 2011, 43).
I  think  it  is  possible  to  relate  this  characterization  of  the  situation  regarding 
Kirchhoff's 'theory' to the one presented in section 3.1 regarding the bending of light and 
antimatter.  From  my  perspective  what  Saatsi  and  Vickers  call  limited  or  local 
underdetermination – in the context of regarding as a theory Kirchhoff's derivation of an 
equation for the particular case of light incident on a screen with an aperture – can be 
rephrased by saying that Kirchhoff's prediction of a diffraction pattern    is a general 
prediction made within an ether theoretical framework, and that (eventually) it can be 
made a case for a strong underdetermination of novel predictions due to this (since that, 
even  if  historically  not  exact,  we  can  see  Kirchhoff's  result  as  part  of  the  novel 
predictions  made  within  the  wave theoretical  description  of  light  in  relation  to  the 
‘older’ corpuscular theory of light). In my view this is where the (possible) cash-value 
for anti-realists is, not in the fact that Kirchhoff deduces his equation in part from wrong 
9 It  is  important  to  notice  that  Saatsi  and  Vickers  are  presenting  a  negative  argument  that  might 
undermine (to some extent) realist positions. They do not explore the possibility of an anti-realist account 
of Kirchhoff's 'novel' prediction.
10 Looking into  the  details  of  both derivations,  the  main difference  is  that  Kirchhoff  makes a  very 
idealized (and mathematically inconsistent) assumption regarding the amplitude of the light waves at the 
aperture.  He considers that the screen does not  perturb the light  waves passing through the aperture, 
which is wrong from the point of view of Maxwell's theory (Saatsi and Vickers 2011, 34-6). A consistent 
formulation of Kirchhoff's  approach is  possible  by making a  more 'correct'  assumption regarding the 
amplitude of the light waves at the aperture by taking into account the scattering of light off the edges of 
the aperture (Saatsi and Vickers 2011, 39).
11 Saatsi refers to it as 'local underdetermination' (Saatsi, 2010, 4) or 'limited underdetermination' (Saatsi 
and Vickers 2011, 43). I will  defend below that, independently of regarding Kirchhoff's equation as a 
theory or not, we can relate Kirchhoff's prediction to what I called general predictions. In this way, when 
adopting an anti-realist position, it  might  be possible (with the appropriate argumentation in terms of 
intertheoretical relations that Saatsi does not provide) to defend the possibility of what I called strong 
underdetermination of novel predictions.
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assumptions.
4  The  problems  related  to  van  Fraassen's  account  of  empirical  success  and 
intertheoretical relations
As we have seen, according to van Fraassen, a new successful theory is only related to 
the old theory in the most minimal way of duplicating the empirical structure of the old 
theory, i.e. it must be empirically adequate where the old theory was. This means that 
according to van Fraassen there is no requirement of theoretical continuityy between the 
theories  (van  Fraassen  2006,  299).  In  his  words,  'the  relation  is  much  looser,  but 
nevertheless very demanding. The difference is that it grants conceptual autonomy to 
the new theory, which is allowed to re-describe nature entirely in its own terms' (van 
Fraassen 2006, 299). If this is the case then anti-realists have an argument to claim the 
existence of a strong underdetermination of novel predictions, since it  would not be 
possible  to  make  sense  of  a  novel  prediction  made  within  different  theoretical 
frameworks by relating the different derivations to the derivation made with a particular 
theory. It does not give an anti-realist account of novel predictions but it would show 
that realists are not better off.
I have two reasons to doubt the strength of van Fraassen's position. Let us consider 
the  first  one.  As  already  mentioned,  van  Fraassen  thinks  one  can  frame  empirical 
success  of  past  theories  simply  by  calling  the  attention  to  the  fact  that  they  give 
approximately the same predictions as the new theories (van Fraassen 2006, 298). In 
fact van Fraassen goes to the point of saying that the empirical success of old theories, 
'consisted  in  their  success  of  fitting  the  data,  the  deliverances  of  experimental  and 
observational experience' (van Fraassen 2006, 303). This is simply not the case because 
we know that, contrary for example to Babylonian astronomy, physical theories actually 
predict unexpected phenomena they were not intended to save. An old theory was in a 
time a new theory that made novel predictions that went beyond the experimental and 
observational experience available. Here is then the first problem for van Fraassen:
Problem 1: it seems that van Fraassen does not offer a convincing characterization of 
physical theories since, for example, it is not able to distinguish between Babylonian 
astronomy (without any novel prediction beyond the data it was intended to save) and 
Newton's theory of gravity (that for example 'predicted' a yet-unknown planet, Neptune; 
see, e.g., Hirst 1946).
Be it in his Darwinian account, or in his more recent views on empirical success, van 
Fraassen  does  not  come  face  to  face  with  the  problem  of  novel  predictions,  only 
indirectly when addressing the issue of the independent support for a new theory. As 
mentioned above, this might be due to a confusing view, mixing the possible historical 
contingency of particular novel predictions with the fact that there are novel predictions 
(van Fraassen 1985, 267), i.e. that in physical  theories, 'saving the phenomena'  goes 
beyond the phenomena they were originally intended to save.
The second problem derives from van Fraassen's account of intertheoretical relations 
in terms of a loose relation between theories without any continuity at the theoretical 
level (van Fraassen 2006, 300).12 
12 For example, according to van Fraassen 'there is no sense in which the models of Newtonian physics 
can in general be embedded in the models of [the special theory of relativity]. The transformation groups 
are too different' (van Fraassen 2006, 299).
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If one accepts van Fraassen's account of intertheoretical relations we cannot even 
give a relative answer regarding a novel prediction made within a particular ('older') 
theoretical  approach in terms of the relation that  this might  have to,  for example,  a 
superseding  theory.  That  it,  at  the  same  time  that  van  Fraassen’s  views  about  
intertheoretical relations bring the possibility of a strong underdetermination of novel  
predictions, it also makes impossible to van Fraassen to give a positive relative answer  
about novel predictions by relating a general novel prediction made within different  
theoretical frameworks to a derivation made using a particular theory. So the second 
problem with van Fraassen views is:
Problem 2: How to understand a general novel prediction from the perspective of, for 
example, a superseding theory, since according to van Fraassen there is no continuity at 
a theoretical level? 
This in not an irrelevant question, since when adopting van Fraassen's account one is 
unable,  for example,  to understand the prediction of the bending of light  within the 
theory of relativity by reference to Einstein’s theory of gravity; also one cannot make 
sense of the proliferation of predictions of antimatter. This is a strong evidence for the 
impossibility of  giving an answer  in  absolute terms (for  example by addressing the 
novelty of the bending of light within Einstein’s theory of gravity). 
We see that without going into the realist/anti-realist debate of what is the right view 
on  intertheoretical  relations  for  each  of  the  cases  that  we  have  considered,  the 
characterization of novel predictions in terms of general or specific novel predictions 
gives  us  a  valuable  perspective  from which  to  address  van  Fraassen's  views:  van  
Fraassen  cannot  provide  an  account  of  a  general  novel  prediction  by  resort  to  a  
particular theory. 
The situation we face then is that it is not just that novel predictions seems to be 
merely blind luck from the perspective of van Fraassen's anti-realism, since as we have 
seen it is missing an account of them in van Fraassen's views on empirical success; it is 
a blind luck that repeats itself in several cases in the same way:  it  is not just that a 
particular prediction, that of the binding of light for example, is a mystery; the case is 
that,  according  to  van  Fraassen,  the  same  novel  prediction  poops  out  from  totally 
unrelated theoretical approaches without any reason for that.
5 Conclusion
According to the view developed in this paper, there are good reasons to doubt that van 
Fraassen's  anti-realism  might  come  up  with  an  account  of  novel  predictions.  Van 
Fraassen’s  views  on  empirical  success  lack  an  account  of  novel  predictions.  Also, 
according to van Fraassen, in theoretical change there is only continuity in the most 
minimal sense of retaining and superseding past empirical knowledge. This makes it 
impossible to make sense of a general novel prediction by resort to a derivation made 
within a particular theory.  That is, van Fraassen's anti-realism cannot make sense of 
novel predictions even in a limited relative way.  Thus,  I  consider  doubtful that van 
Fraassen's  anti-realism might  come out with a philosophical  account  of the  de facto 
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